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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine institutional effects on the private participation in 
infrastructure (PPI) projects during the recent period for 2002-2017 with 117 sample 
economies, by using the PPI and the Worldwide Governance Indicators database of the 
World Bank. The study contributes to enriching the evidence by updating the sample time-
horizon and by widening the coverage of sample economies. The main findings of this 
study are summarized as follow: the institutional role in promoting the PPI projects are 
clearly identified in terms of government governance indicators such as government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption; in particular, the 
control of corruption, which is the controversial issue in the previous studies, is confirmed 
to be one of the important factors to boost the PPI projects; and the macroeconomic 
stability is also a significant contributor for the PPI projects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been and will be an enormous demand for infrastructure in emerging 
market and developing economies. McKinsey Global Institute (2016), for instance, 
estimates that the infrastructure investment in the world would grow from 31.4 trillion 
US dollars (at constant 2015 prices) for 2000-2015 toward 49.1 trillion US dollars for 
2016-2030, and also shows that the majority of the investment, around 60 percent of the 
total investment for 2016-2030, would be required in emerging market economies. In 
accordance with the growing trend in infrastructure investment, the “private participation” 
in infrastructure (PPI, hereafter) has represented a significant presence from financial and 
operational perspectives. Figure 1 demonstrates the increasing trends in PPI in terms of 
number of projects and total investment commitments for the period between 1984 and 
2017 based on the PPI database of the World Bank. Regarding the total investment 
commitments, their values have grown from 1990 to 2017 by 7.3 times while the world 
GDP has increased during the same period by 3.4 times. 
The PPI is considered to be one of the styles of public-private partnerships, and its 
original concept seems to come from the so-called New Public Management in the United 
Kingdom. Advanced countries have adopted this management in their infrastructure 
development for the purpose of enhancing managerial skills of public organizations and 
reducing public sectors’ inefficiency. The recent PPI emergence for emerging-market and 
developing economies, however, seems to have a different background. They have faced 
a growing infrastructure demand and at the same time a lack of fiscal space to deal with 
it. The PPI has helped fill the so-called infrastructure gap by leveraging financial 
resources with private sectors. 
The question then arises at to what characterizes countries that have been successful 
in attracting the PPI in infrastructure projects. Banerjee et al. (2006) argues that the 
“institution” plays an important role in supporting the PPI, since the infrastructure 
investment has such unique nature as high sunk costs, economies of scale, high levels of 
risk and uncertainty and high transaction costs. To be specific, the institutional elements 
such as rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption are considered to reduce 
investment uncertainty, risk and costs in the PPI projects. Doh and Ramamurti (2003) also 
emphasizes the role of government in the successes and failures of infrastructure 
investments for investors and developers. 
There have been a significant number of empirical studies examining the effects of 
institutional qualities on economic development in general (e.g., North, 1990; Rodrik et 
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al., 2002; Lee and Kim, 2009; Vaal and Ebben, 2011; Flachaire et al., 2014). The limited 
studies have, however, investigated the institutional impacts on private investment in 
infrastructure projects. Although some studies have targeted specific sector’s investments 
(e.g., Bergara et al., 1998), few have analyzed the total PPI effects in relation to a wide 
variety of institutional variables. There are the following two studies in this context. 
Hammami et al. (2006) analyzes the determinants of public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
in infrastructure projects using the PPI database of the World Bank on the projects in 
developing countries for 1990-2003. They find that the market conditions and 
macroeconomic stability are important channels of determinants of PPIs, and also that the 
control of corruption and the rule of law contributes to attracting private investor to 
infrastructure projects. Banerjee et al. (2006) examines empirically how different 
institutional structures affect private investment in infrastructure in emerging market 
economies by utilizing the same PPI database for 1990-2000. They indicate that 
institutional factors such as property rights and bureaucratic quality as well as 
macroeconomic performances play a significant role in promoting private infrastructure 
investment, and also that countries with higher levels of corruption attract greater private 
participation in infrastructure. They interpret the corruption effect, for instance, such that 
countries with higher levels of corruption would be more aggressive in deregulating 
infrastructure and private companies would be attracted to such countries for 
opportunistic reasons. These two studies target the period until the early 2000s as their 
samples and produce a contrasting outcome on the corruption effect on the PPI. 
This paper aims to revisit the issue of institutional role in the PPI and to reexamine 
empirically institutional impacts on the PPI in the recent period for 2002-2017 using the 
PPI database and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. The 
study would contribute to the reviewed literature above as follows. First, this study 
enriches the evidence of the institutional effects on the PPI by updating the targeted 
sample from the period until the early 2000s to the one for the recent decades for 2002-
2017. Second, this study widens the coverage of sample developing economies by using 
the WGI database as institutional variables. The previous studies depended on the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database for measuring institutional quality for 
the sample period until the early 2000s, but since 2002 the WGI database has become 
available every year as institutional variables. Against the 117 sample economies 
available in the PPI database for 2002-2017, all the 117 economies are also available as 
the sample in the WGI database, whereas only the 83 economies excluding the 34 ones 
containing Cambodia and Lao DPR were sampled in the ICRG database. Through 
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updating and widening samples, the evidence could be added on the critical issue of the 
corruption effect, on which the previous two studies had a contrasting outcome. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section represents empirics 
on the institutional impacts on the PPI: key variables and data, methodology, estimation 
outcomes and discussions. The last section summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Empirics 
 
This section conducts empirical analyses of the impacts of the institutional variables 
on the PPI, describing key variables and data, methodology, estimation outcomes and 
discussions. 
 
2.1 Key Variables and Data 
This study adopts the variables common to the previous two studies, i.e., Hammami 
et al. (2006) and Banerjee et al. (2006), considering their data availability for the sample 
period from 2002 to 2017. For the dependent variables, both studies use two kinds of 
indicators: number of projects and total investment commitments in the PPI database of 
the World Bank. As for explanatory variables, Hammami et al. (2006) derives 12 
hypotheses about possible determinants of the extent of the PPI, and adopts 17 variables 
(8 variables for institutional category and 9 variables for economic factors). Banerjee et 
al. (2006) uses 16 variables (7 institutional variables and 9 economic variables) under 6 
proposed hypotheses. 
This study chooses number of projects and total investment commitments in the PPI 
for dependent variables as in the previous studies, and finally selects 11 explanatory 
variables (6 institutional ones and 5 economic ones). The variables are listed with their 
measurement and data sources in Table 1, and their descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 2. The details of each variable are described as follows. 
Regarding the dependent PPI variables, i.e., number of projects (PPIN) and total 
investment commitments (PPIV), their data are retrieved from the PPI database of the 
World Bank as in the previous studies. The PPI database has data on over 6,400 
infrastructure projects in the energy, telecommunications, transport, and water and 
sewerage sectors, and the projects include management or lease contracts, concessions, 
greenfield projects, and divestitures. The database covers 139 low- and middle-income 
countries, and in this study 117 countries out of them could be sampled totally for the 
sample period for 2002-2017. The total investment commitments (PPIV) in terms of 
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million US dollars are transformed in logarithm to avoid scaling issues. It is because, 
although the investment would be better expressed as a share of GDP, the share is 
negligible for all sample countries with very little variation, as Banerjee et al. (2006) 
suggests.   
For the institutional variables as explanatory ones, the data comes from the WGI 
database of the World Bank. This study adopts all the indicators the WGI database 
provides: voice and accountability (VOA), political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (PSV), government effectiveness (GVE), regulatory quality (REQ), 
rule of law (ROL) and control of corruption (COR). Those indicators are almost 
corresponding to the institutional variables in the previous two studies using the ICRG 
database. Each of the WGI indicators takes the number ranging from approximately -2.5 
(weak) to 2.5 (strong). The reasons why the WGI database is used here are as follows. 
First, the database has newly been developed since 1996 and the time-series data has been 
available every year from 2002 to the present. Second, what is more important is that the 
WGI database has wider coverage of sample developing economies than the ICRG 
database. Against the 117 sample economies available in the PPI database for 2002-2017, 
all the 117 economies are also available as the sample in the WGI database, whereas only 
the 83 economies excluding the 34 ones containing Cambodia and Lao DPR would be  
sampled in the ICRG database. 
For the economic variables as explanatory ones, the study adopts five indicators: 
inflation (INF), GDP growth (GRW), GDP per capita (GDPPC), exchange rate (EXR) 
and government budget balance (GBL). The first four indicators represent 
macroeconomic stability and conditions, and the last one shows government constraints, 
as used in the previous studies. INF and GRW are expressed by year-on-year rate of 
changes in consumer prices and real GDP, respectively. GDPPC is shown by current US 
dollars and EXR is presented by the period average of national currency per US dollars. 
GBL is expressed by the general government net lending or borrowing as a percent of 
GDP. GDPPC and EXR are set in logarithm to avoid scaling issues. All the economic 
variables are lagged by one year as they may be endogenous to the model. The data 
sources of INF, GRW and GDPPC are the World Development Indicators, World Bank, 
and those of EXR and BBL are the International Financial Statistics and the World 
Economic Outlook Databases of the International Monetary Fund, respectively. 
Then the study constructs the panel data with 117 countries for 2002-2017 for the 
subsequent estimation, based on the data availability of the PPI and WGI databases. 
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2.2 Methodologies 
The study then turns to specifying the estimation equation in the following way. 
 
y = α + β*I + γ*E + ε   (1) 
 
where y, I, E are PPI variables (PPIN and PPIV), institutional variables (VOA, PSV, GVE, 
REQ, ROL and COR) and economic variables (INF, GRW, GDPPC, EXR and GBL), 
respectively. α, β, γ, ε are constant term, parameter of institutional and economic variables 
and error term, respectively. 
There would be a threat of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. Table 
3 indicates that the bivariate correlations between institutional variables are more than 0.5 
except the correlation between PSV and RGQ, whereas those between economic variables 
are less than 0.4. The variance inflation factor (VIF), a method of measuring the level of 
collinearity between the regressors in an equation, tells that ROL (11.934) is far beyond 
the standard level of collinearity and GVE (9.112), COR (7.870) and REQ (6.306) are in 
the risky zone inducing multicollinearity, while the other variables including all the 
economic ones range in the normal level. Thus the institutional variables, specifically, 
ROL, GVE, COR and REQ, would cause multicollinearity, and so these variables should 
be treated as independent regressors in the estimation equation (1). The subsequent 
estimation, therefore, uses four sets of the institutional variables: (GVE, VOA, PSV), 
(REQ, VOA, PSV), (ROL, VOA, PSV) and (COR, VOA, PSV), and also full-set of those 
variables as a reference. 
Regarding the estimation methodologies, in the regression where the dependent 
variable is the number of projects (PPIN), i.e., integer values that represent the number 
of events that occur, the study employs a count data model. Since over-dispersion occurs 
due to a large number of zeros in the PPI database, this study adopts the negative binomial 
regression model as in Banerjee et al. (2006). As for the regression in which the dependent 
variable is the total investment commitments (PPIV), i.e., continuous nonnegative values, 
the study relies on the Tobit regression model, namely, the canonical censored regression 
model, as in Hammami et al. (2006). 
 
2.3 Estimation Outcomes and Discussions 
Table 4 represents the estimation outcomes on the number of projects (PPIN) with 
the negative binomial regression model and the total investment commitments (PPIV) 
with the Tobit regression model. The outcomes could be summarized as follows. 
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Regarding the institutional variables, the government governance indicators of 
government effectiveness (GVE), regulatory quality (REQ), rule of law (ROL) and 
control of corruption (COR) are identified to have positive effects on both the number of 
projects (PPIN) and the total investment commitments (PPIV) at the 99 percent 
significant level, when they are treated as independent regressors in the regressions from 
(1) to (4). It should be noted that there are contrasting results in ROL and COR in the 
reference regression (5) including all the institutional variables: the effects of ROL on 
PPIN and PPIV is insignificant and negative respectively, and those of COR are 
significantly negative. These results in the regression (5) could be attributed to the 
regressors’ multicollinearity problem, since ROL and COR have high levels of VIF as 
examined in the previous section. Based on the regressions from (1) to (4) avoiding the 
multicollinearity, all the four governance indicators are considered to have positive effects 
on the PPI projects (thus the regressions from (1) to (4) are focused on hereafter). The 
estimation results on governance indicators from (1) to (4) are basically consistent with 
those of Hammami et al. (2006) and Banerjee et al. (2006). Those two studies, however, 
reveal different results of the corruption effects on the PPI: Banerjee et al. (2006) shows 
a negative effect of the corruption control on the PPI, whereas Hammami et al. (2006) 
represents its positive effect. Thus this study could enrich the evidence to support 
Hammami et al. (2006), by updating the sample time-horizon and by widening the 
coverage of sample economies. 
As for the other institutional variables, the variable of the voice and accountability 
(VOA) shows mixed results according to the regressions, and so does not provide any 
clear messages on its PPI effects. The variable of the political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (PSV), on the other hand, has significantly negative effects on both 
PPIN and PPIV. The result seems to be against usual expectation that the political stability 
is a basic requirement for attracting the PPI projects. It is true that Hammami et al. (2006) 
argues the need for controlling political risks for the PPI, but at the same time they present 
the hypothesis that the PPI arrangements are likely to be positively correlated with “ethnic 
fractionalization”. It means that the ethnic fractionalization represents the heterogeneity 
of preferences in the overall population; it often leads to political tensions; and the 
political endeavors to satisfy the conflicting demands produce more PPI projects. The 
PSV adverse effect on PPI in this study might reflect the channel of this ethnic 
fractionalization. 
Concerning the impacts of the economic variables on PPI, the regressions of the total 
investment commitments (PPIV) do not have clear results compared with those of the 
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number of projects (PPIN). It might be probably because the values of investment 
commitments themselves depend on the sector, type and status of the PPI projects. 
Focusing on the PPIN, most of the estimated coefficients follow the usual expectation. 
The macroeconomic stability is identified as an important factor to boost the PPI projects: 
high inflation (INF) and currency depreciation (EXR) have negative effects on PPIN, and 
high GDP growth (GRW) and GDP per capita (GDPPC) have positive effects on PPIN. 
The government constraints also push up the PPI projects as shown in the negative effect 
of GBL on PPIN. 
The emphasis of the empirical study here is summarized as follow. The institutional 
role in promoting the PPI projects are clearly identified in terms of government 
governance indicators such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption. In particular, the control of corruption, which is the 
controversial issue in the previous studies, is confirmed to be one of the important factors 
to boost the PPI projects, when the regressors’ multicollinearity problem is avoided. The 
macroeconomic stability in terms of prices, currency value and economic growth is also 
a significant contributor for the PPI projects. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper aims to revisit the issue of institutional role in the PPI and to reexamine 
empirically institutional impacts on the PPI in the recent period for 2002-2017 using the 
PPI and WGI database of the World Bank. The study contributes to enriching the evidence 
of the institutional effects on the PPI by updating the sample time-horizon and by 
widening the coverage of sample economies. By doing so, the evidence could be added 
on the critical issue of the corruption effect, on which the previous studies had a 
contrasting outcome.  
The main findings of this study are summarized as follow. The institutional role in 
promoting the PPI projects are clearly identified in terms of government governance 
indicators such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control 
of corruption. In particular, the control of corruption, which is the controversial issue in 
the previous studies, is confirmed to be one of the important factors to boost the PPI 
projects, by avoiding the regressors’ multicollinearity. The macroeconomic stability in 
terms of prices, currency value and economic growth is also a significant contributor for 
the PPI projects. 
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Figure 1 Trend in Private Participation in Infrastructure 
 
Sources: Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, The World Bank 
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Table 1 List of Variables 
 
Sources: Author’s description 
 
  
Variables Description Data Siources
Dependent Variables
PPIN Number of Projects of Pivate Participation of Infrastructure (PPI) 
PPIV Total Investment Commitments of PPI [million USD, log term]
Explanatory Variables: Institution 
VOA Voice and Accountability  [from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)]
PSV Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism [ditto]
GVE Government Effectiveness [ditto]
RGQ Regulatory Quality [ditto]
ROL Rule of Law [ditto]
COR Control of Corruption[ditto]
Explanatory Variables: Economic Conditions
INF Inflation, consumer prices [annual %, lagged]
GRW GDP growth [annual %, lagged]
GDPPC GDP per capita [current USD, log term, lagged]
EXR National Currency per USD [period average, log term, lagged]
International Financial Statistics,
IMF
GBL General government net lending/borrowing [percent of GDP, lagged]
World Economic Outlook
Databases, IMF
PPI Database, World Bank
Worldwide Governance Indicators,
World Bank
World Development Indicators,
World Bank
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sources: Author’s estimation 
 
 
  
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Dependent Variables
PPIN 1,872 2.59 9.90 0 127
PPIV 1,872 2.28 3.07 0 10.94
Explanatory Variables: Institution 
VOA 1,872 -0.43 0.75 -2.31 1.22
PSV 1,861 -0.45 0.87 -3.31 1.38
GVE 1,865 -0.49 0.59 -2.44 1.26
RGQ 1,864 -0.48 0.64 -2.64 1.24
ROL 1,872 -0.56 0.59 -2.60 1.07
COR 1,872 -0.53 0.56 -1.86 1.56
Explanatory Variables: Economic Conditions
INF 1,762 7.13 10.30 -18.10 254.94
GRW 1,819 4.66 4.94 -33.10 64.06
GDPPC 1,830 7.62 1.03 4.71 9.68
EXR 1,795 3.72 2.69 -2.89 22.62
GBL 1,807 -2.19 6.19 -35.39 125.13
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
[Institutional Variables] 
 
[Economic variables]  
 
Sources: Author’s estimation 
  
VOA PSV GVE RGQ ROL COR
VOA 1
PSV 0.500 1
GVE 0.578 0.512 1
RGQ 0.671 0.430 0.818 1
ROL 0.686 0.662 0.842 0.772 1
COR 0.642 0.646 0.784 0.644 0.850 1
VIF 3.027 2.437 9.112 6.306 11.934 7.870
INF EXR GRW GBL GDPPC
INF 1
EXR 0.018 1
GRW 0.029 0.056 1
GBL 0.017 -0.040 0.058 1
GDPPC -0.148 -0.365 -0.171 0.010 1
VIF 1.568 1.928 1.740 1.099 1.449
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Table 4 Estimation Outcomes 
[Number of Projects (PPIN) with Negative Binomial Regression Model] 
 
  
PPIN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GVE 2.170 *** 2.500 ***
(15.109) (10.239)
RGQ 1.828 *** 0.521 ***
(11.279) (2.647)
ROL 1.778 *** 0.054
(9.279) (0.189)
COR 1.060 *** -1.300 ***
(5.216) (-5.182)
VOA -0.132 -0.324 *** -0.395 *** -0.174 * -0.017
(-1.541) (-3.732) (-4.055) (-1.852) (-0.166)
PSV -1.014 *** -0.936 *** -1.077 *** -0.958 *** -0.849 ***
(-11.425) (-10.091) (-10.496) (-9.047) (-8.984)
INF -0.007 -0.004 -0.018 ** -0.030 *** -0.005
(-0.795) (-0.493) (-1.984) (-3.236) (-0.596)
EXR -0.041 * -0.063 *** -0.100 *** -0.096 *** -0.055 **
(-1.933) (-2.907) (-4.698) (-4.187) (-2.559)
GRW 0.044 *** 0.069 *** 0.049 *** 0.064 *** 0.050 ***
(3.125) (4.904) (3.275) (4.241) (3.576)
GBL -0.030 ** -0.061 *** -0.025 * -0.059 *** -0.032 **
(-2.405) (-4.515) (-1.811) (-4.144) (-2.398)
GDPPC 0.110 *** 0.079 *** 0.151 *** 0.122 *** 0.082 ***
(7.707) (5.315) (9.377) (7.788) (5.296)
Observations 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1587
Mean dependent var. 2.910 2.910 2.910 2.910 2.910
S.E. of regression 10.283 15.239 10.374 17.370 10.586
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[Total Investment Commitments (PPIV) with Tobit Regression Model] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance, 
respectively. 
Sources: Author’s estimation 
 
PPIV (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GVE 5.120 *** 4.667 ***
(13.201) (7.067)
RGQ 5.691 *** 3.644 ***
(13.854) (6.710)
ROL 3.662 *** -1.213 *
(7.842) (-1.668)
COR 1.977 *** -2.345 ***
(4.238) (-3.718)
VOA 0.208 -0.628 ** 0.407 0.941 *** 0.029
(0.717) (-2.017) (1.266) (2.870) (0.090)
PSV -2.874 *** -2.469 *** -3.015 *** -2.538 *** -2.180 ***
(-12.082) (-10.735) (-11.171) (-9.450) (-8.552)
INF -0.023 0.004 -0.047 ** -0.066 *** -0.000
(-1.063) (0.191) (-2.032) (-2.842) (-0.003)
EXR 0.097 0.076 -0.024 -0.048 0.095
(1.549) (1.225) (-0.374) (-0.721) (1.545)
GRW 0.051 0.065 * 0.035 0.033 0.070 **
(1.443) (1.822) (0.959) (0.918) (2.006)
GBL -0.034 -0.036 -0.034 -0.066 ** -0.038
(-1.084) (-1.139) (-1.075) (-2.022) (-1.182)
GDPPC 0.043 0.001 0.083 * 0.043 -0.032
(1.011) (0.038) (1.855) (0.944) (-0.735)
Observations 1,587 1,587 1,587 1,587 1587
Mean dependent var. 2.510 2.510 2.510 2.510 2.510
S.E. of regression 2.850 2.859 2.991 3.048 2.797
